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1. The failure of the "liberation policy" (1956-1961) 
One of the most obvious lessons of the events in Poland and 
Hungary in 1956 for the U.S. was the failure of its official policy 
pursued vis-á-vis the European communist countries since 1953. The 
policy of the "rollback of communism" and the "liberation of the 
captive nations" turned out to bo no more than empty rhetorics during 
the first days of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower wondered at a meeting of the National 
Security Council (NSC) on October 26 if the Soviet Union would not 
"tempted to resort to extreme measures, even to start a world war" in 
case it lost its power over its satellites.1 As a matter of fact, the 
President harbored some doubts about his Secretary of State, J. F. 
Dulles's sharp anti-Communist rhetoric since 1953." The way-out in 
this dilemma was offered by adopting a strictly legalistic-moralistic 
approach toward the events in Eastern-Europe and the Middle-East. 
The leading American statesmen denounced the use of force in 
international matters as "immoral" and called upon the Soviet Union 
as well as Izrael and the latter's allies, Great Britain and France to 
abstain from agression. The forum for this action was provided by the 
General Assembly of the UN and its resolutions; but while the U.S. 
made great efforts to enforce the resolutions regarding the Middle 
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East, it did not do too much to do the same as far as Hungary was 
concerned. Dulles concluded with some satisfaction in mid-December, 
1956 that the 60 satellite divisions "could no longer be regarded as an 
addition to Soviet forces—in fact they may immobilize certain Soviet 
forces."3 
The U.S. Congress realized the need for a shift in the policy toward 
Europe in general, and Eastern-Europe in particular. A Congressional 
delagation was dispatched to the West-European capitals in April 
1957, two members of the delegation, Alwin M. Bentley and James G. 
Fulton visited Poland and Yugoslavia as well. The Congressmen in 
their report called for a more active American policy concerning the 
East-European nations in the fields of international relations, 
economic ties and even propaganda.4 Senator John F. Kennedy urged 
that the administration do its best to promote "peaceful change behind 
the Iron Curtain whenever this would help wean the so-called captive 
nations from their Kremlin masters." This shift in tone was noticed— 
among others—by the Hungarian chargé, Tibor Zádor, who reported 
about a changing American-Polish relationship: Wladyslaw Gomulka 
was treated as a "Communist but a good Polish patriot", the so-called 
national Communism (the Yugoslav model) was promoted by the 
American leaders, and even the American-Bulgarian relations 
improved: the two countries broke off diplomatic relations because of 
a spy-case in 1951, but in the summer of 1957 the American 
administration lifted the prohibiton for American citizens visiting 
Bulgaria and the administration was even busy preparing an answer lo 
two former Bulgarian notes, which suggested the restoration of the 
diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Bulgaria.6 In a broader sense, the 
exchange of messages between the Soviet Union and U.S. in late 1957 
and early 1958 can also be seen as a sign of easing the tension 
between the two blocs. The Soviets, namely Premier Bulganin, 
suggested the freeze of nuklear testing, the demilitarization of Central-
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Europe and a non-agression treaty between the NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact, while President Eisenhower in his reply on January 12, 
1958 proposed the termination of the veto right of the great powers in 
the Security Council, the unification of Germany after free elections, 
the free choice of the form of government in Eastern-Europe as 
stipulated at Yalta, and the termination of the arms race. The points 
relevant to Central-Europe were picked up by others as well: the 
Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Adam Rapacki broached the idea 
of a nuclear-free Central Europe, while George F. Kennan in his 
Reith-lectures on the BBC elaborated on the theme of 
"disengagement", that is the mutual withdrawal of troops from the 
region. As the Western leadership believed that either of the plans 
would give unilateral advantages to the Soviets in the military field, 
neither of them was accepted. Instead, the NSC spelt out the mainlines 
of the new American goals in Central-Europe in the spring of 1958. 
The report declared that "the Soviet control over the region ... is ...a 
threat to peace and to /the/ security of the U. S. and Western Europe. 
... Poland's ability to maintain the limited independence gained in 
October 1956 will be a key factor affecting future political 
development in Eastern Europe /and Yugoslavia/ ... The current 
ferment in Eastern-Europe offers new opportunities, though still 
limited, to influence the dominated regimes through greater U.S. 
activity, both private and official, in such fields as tourist travel, 
cultural exchange and economic relations, including exchanging of 
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technical and commercial visitors." The report warned that major 
East-West agreements would run the greatest risk, so the policy of 
"small steps" should be preferred in this situation. As for Hungary, the 
NSC maintained that because the country had become an important 
psychological factor in the world struggle, the U.S. policy pursued 
here should not compromize the "symbol" which Hungary had 
become. 
The Eisenhower Administration thought that field to yield the 
greatest success might be that of the economic relations: on August 
14, 1958 the administration announced the reduction of controls on 
exports to Soviet bloc countries.8 The initial steps were rather 
promising for the Americans, at least as far as Poland was concerned. 
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Economic relations were established between the two countries in 
1957, negotiations started concerning cultural exchange programs, and 
Vice-President Richard M. Nixon visited Poland on August 2-5, 1959. 
However, the reaction of the Polish people to the visit startled 
Gomulka and the Communist leadership in Poland, who had pursued a 
conciliatory policy toward the U.S. in 1957 and 1958 mainly as an 
attempt to establish some counterbalance to the heavy Soviet presence 
in the region. The Soviets were also more restricted in these years than 
before because they did not want, and could not afford, to have 
"another Hungary"; however, from 1959 on thez were able to put 
more pressure on the Polish leaders and Gomulka was a "good 
Communist" in the first place and a "good patriot" only in the second, 
after all. The positions became more rigid and confrontational on the 
other side too: the U.S. Congress passed the Captive Nations 
Resolution in July 1959, and the July 27, 1960 report of the NSC 
stated that the establishment of the economic, cultural, technical, etc. 
fields could not effected without the cooperation of the other side; in 
short: the Eisenhower Administration accepted the then dead J.F. 
Dulles's proposal that the socialist countries were only "inching their 
way" toward independence and it was in the interest of the Atlantic 
Community not to interfere with the pace of it in any way.4 
US-East-European Economic relations in the 1950s 
The economic relations between 1948 and 1956—if we can speak 
of any at all—were defined by the various commercial restrictions and 
embargoes: the political concept of a "monolith Communist bloc" 
resulted in a "monolithic" economic policy. First of all, the Anti-
Dumping Act of 1921 was still in force and as the economic relations 
of the socialist countries were distorted by the political considerations, 
"dumping" could also be evoked against the export of goods of these 
countries. Another pre-World War II act, the Johnson Act of 1934 was 
also still in existence, which provided that the American business 
enterprises could extend loans and credits to the so-called non-friendly 
countries only for a period of six months; the East-European countries 
were always short of foreign exchange and therefore they were 
interested in medium- and long-term loans in the first place. Congress 
" Quoted in McKitterick, Nathaniel M. East-West Trade. The 20th Century Fund. 
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attached a clause to the Foreign Aid Act in March 1948: Section 
117(d) excluded countries from the Marshall-aid which exported 
material under export embargo in the U.S. to any European countries 
which were not beneficiaries of the aid-program. As for the list of 
goods forbidden to be exported to the Communist countries, the 
Export Control Act of February 28, 1949 provided for a unilateral 
American commitment; it was later supplemented by an international 
list of embargoed items on November 22, 1949. The CG-COCOM list 
(Consultative Group Coordinating Committee) of January 1, 1950 was 
accepted by 15 Western countries by 1953. Furthermore, these 
countries put together the CHINCOM-list, i.e. the list of embargoed 
goods with relation to China during the Korean War, while in the U.S. 
another act forbade the import of woolen goods from Eastern 
European countries, which maintained contacts with North Korea or 
China or which re-exported the goods of the latter countries. The 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives under the 
chairmanship of Laurice C. Battle proposed an act about a more 
extensive list of embargoed goods than the COCOM-list; President 
Truman signed it on October 26, 1950. The Battle Act of 1951 
(Mutual Defense Aid Control Act) threatened any country with an 
embargo which was regarded as a security risk to the U.S. The same 
year, the most favored nation status was revoked from all the 
Communist countries and all economic ties with the Soviet Union 
were broken. 
This long list of prohibition was somehow broken only in 1954. in 
the wake of the death of Stalin, when Congress passed the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (commonly 
known as PL 480), which made the export of agricultural surplus 
possible. At the same time, Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
suggested in the House of Commons on February 25, 1954 that 
substantial relaxation be effected in the field of supplying raw material 
and manufactured goods to the Communist countries.10 The 
restrictions in the East-West trade hurt the West-European countries 
more than the U.S.: while the former depended on the import of 
energy from and the export of manufactured goods to the East-
European countries, the U.S. trade with this region was below 1% of 
the total. 
10 DSB. Vol. XLII, No. 1087. April 25, 1960. 670-673. 
The gradual shift in the assessment of the East-West relations made 
itself felt in the area of the economic relations, too. The 
Administration argued after 1956 that "national Communism" was 
kept in existence in Yugoslavia mainly because Tito opened up the 
country for more intensive trade relations with the West. Cautious 
steps were taken by the Administration in this field: for instance, the 
Rumanian Deputy Minister for Financial Affairs, Radu Manescu and 
Assistant Secretary of State Foy D. Kohler signed an agreement on 
March 30, 1960 to settle the outstanding financial questions between 
the two countries. The agreement was important for the Rumanians 
because under the stipulations of the Johnson Act of 1934 no country 
could get American loans which had outstanding financial questions 
with the U.S." Later, the Hungarians, the Czechoslovaks, and the 
Bulgarians were also forced to enter into negotiations regarding 
unsettled financial issues with the U.S. because they increasingly 
needed the American or international loans and credits to stabilize 
their economies. This endeavor became one of the sources of the basic 
disagreement between the U.S. and the countries related to above: 
while the latter sought economic advantages, the U.S. had no special 
interest in promoting trade for its own sake. As Assistant Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs Thomas G. Mann declared: "... From a 
purely economic standpoint, the true limitation on the magnitude of 
U.S. exports to Eastern Europe is the ability of these countries to earn 
1 ^ 
dollars through exports to the LI.S. or other hard-currency markets." ~ 
It was the Polish who had the most intense economic relations with 
the U.S.—besides Yugoslavia—from among the East-European states 
and their experience in this field frequently served as a yardstick for 
the other satellites. The American Ambassador to Warsaw claimed in 
his memoirs that the Polish Ambassador to Washington. D.C. 
Spasowski had a meeting in the State Department on October 20, 1956 
where he told the Americans that Gomulka had to implement 
economic reforms and he would not decline assistance from abroad. 
Four days later the American representation in Warsaw approached 
the Polish leaders with an offer, but the Polish Foreign Minister Józef 
Winievicz rejected "aid" and declared that Poland was more interested 
in the restoration of the most favored nation treatment. The 
" DSB. Vol. XLII, No. 1093. June 6, 1960. 931. 
12 Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe on the Policy toward the Satellite 
Nations. Washington. D.C., 1957. 10. 
international situation favored a bold Polish policy in this respect. The 
Soviets wanted to avoid the repetition of the events in Hungary on a 
larger sclae—such an event would have threatened with either the 
dissolution of the Soviet empire in Eastern-Europe or with a third 
World War. At the same time, Alwin M. Bentley, a member of the 
Congressional delegation to Poland in April 1957 warned that "... 
/T/he present Polish regime is in a very precarious position and, if the 
current economic situation continues to deteriorate, could collapse by 
late fall. The only foreseeable result would then be a return to a 
Stalinist type government ... any weakening of Soviet economic 
domination of this area would be a net gain for the free world."1 ' 
However, the Republican Administration had to reconcile its more 
pragmatic approach to its harsh anti-Communist stance. The dilemma 
was solved on January 5, 1957 when the Administration announced 
that "Poland was not a nation dominated or controlled by the foreign 
government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist 
movement"14, therefore the country qualified for the agricultural 
surplus shipments under Section 117 of PL 480. The decision 
triggered an intense debate in the U.S. Senator William K. Knowland 
opposed any economic agreements with any Communist country, 
while the head of the Congressional delegation to Europe in April 
1957, Edna F. Kelly of New York stated that it was an "April Fools' 
Day" joke to saz that Poland was independent from the Soviet 
Union.^ On the other side of the aisle, influential politicians lobbied 
for the deal; let it suffice here to quote from Sen. John F. Kennedy's 
address at the Overseas Press Club on May 6, 1957: " ... Other 
satellites, we may be sure, are watching—and if we fail to help the 
Poles, who else will dare stand up to the Russians and look westward? 
... /If we grant the aid/ ... we drive still another wedge between the 
Polish Government and the Kremlin... The basic laws governing our 
foreign economic policies ... recognize only two categories of nations 
in the world: nations "under the domination or control" of the USSR 
or the world Communist movement—and "friendly nations". I suggest 
13 Quoted in Adler-Karlsson, Gunnar. Western Economic Warfare, 1947-1967. 
Stockholm. 1968. 99-100. 
14 Congressional Record. 85th Congress, 1st Sess. Vol. 103. No. XI. 7364-68 and 
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to you that there are more shades of /color/ than black and white ..."1(1 
The last sentence of the speech has special relevance: it meant a 
departure from the bipolar world view which characterized the first 
phase of the Cold War (1946-1961) and pointed toward the concept of 
a "multipolar world", which was elaborated on and implemented by 
the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy leadership in the early 1970s. 
Because of this bipolar approach and the doctrines like the "massive 
retaliation", the Eisenhower Administration was forced into a 
passivity in the East-West relations. The Administration was not able 
to carry out a total face-about in the Polish-question either: the 
agreements signed with Poland in June and August 1957 provided a 
30 million dollars loan to Poland through the Export-Import Bank and 
allowed Poland—with the rather liberal interpretation of PL 480—to 
purchase agricultural suplus in the U.S. in the value of 46.1 million 
dollars; both sums were considerably lower than the ones the Polish 
asked for. However, by 1961 Polamd had receiced the MFN-status for 
the second time in the face of only weak Congressional opposition and 
the real question was whether this liberalization of the East-West 
relations would be continued and extended to the other satellite 
countries in Eastern Europe. 
2. "Great expectations" and meager results (1961-1963) 
a. The Kennan-Brzezinski Doctrine 
The ideological underpinning of the policies of the Democratic 
administrations for the better part of the 1960s is said to be determined 
by Zbigniew Brzezinski by a number of contemporaries and 
historians. It is a fact that the historian-politician became one of the 
most prominent members of the Policy Planning Staff of the State 
Department by the second half of the 1960s and later, in the Carter 
Administration, became the national security adviser. Brzezinski's 
starting point was the criticism of the foreign policy of Jogn Foster 
Dulles: he believed that the "verbal hostility" took the place of real 
political ideas in the years of 1953-1957.17 He argued that the political 
shift in 1957 was only symbolic: the relatively small credit extended 
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to Poland and the support of a few cultural exchange programs were 
still at variance with the professed goal of the U.S., namely, the 
destruction of Communist power in Eastern-Europe. In Brzezinski's 
reading, 1956 could be attributed to the "spirit of Geneva", i. e. it was 
the early détente that undermined Soviet political hegemony in 
Eastern Europe and the continuation of the relaxation of tensions 
would bring about the final collapse of Communism and not the 
confrontational style of the Republican administrations in the 1950s. 
Nevertheless, détente should not mean primarily the relaxation of 
economic relations: nowhere did economic aid bring about the 
political and social liberalization of a given country; for instance, 
opposition to the Soviet dominance started both in Yugoslavia and in 
Poland before American economic aid was extended to them—later 
the liberalization of the Hungarian political life was also introduced 
without any American financial pressure in 1962-1963. The solution 
should be a dual American policy: on one hand, the East-European 
regimes should be accepted as they were, on the other, the peoples 
living under their domination should be separated from them. In 
practice, it would amount to the maintenance of the formal relations 
and the encouragement and extension of the informal ones; in other 
words, the regimes should be "softened up" from within within the 
, 1 o 
lramework ol a "peaceful coexistence". 1 In particular, the West 
should (1) promote the appearance of "national communisms"; thus 
(2) enhance the chances of the East-European countries to loosen their 
ties with the USSR; and (3) ultimately create a neutral zone in the 
region ("Finlandization"). This program needed patient, long-ranging 
policies: evolution should be the goal instead of forceful 
"liberation".19 
George F. Kennan became famous for his Long Telegram in 1946 
and his article signed as "X" in the Foreign Affairs next year. In the 
wake of the Polish and Hungarian events in 1956 he modified his 
"containment" policy and broached the idea of "disengagement". 
Later, he became Ambassador to Belgrad but resigned in 1963 
because of the trade restrictions imposed by the U.S. Congress 
concerning Yugoslavia. Upon returning, he proposed that instead of 
the bipolar world as conceived in the early years of the Cold War, a 
18 ibid. 644-645. 
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"policentristic" one emerged: there were three distinct Communist 
blocs, namely the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern-Europe.20 Kennan 
urged that the issue of the East-West trade was a political question in 
the first place, but he objected to the Congressional approach which 
demanded political concessions for everyday commercial deals from 
the socialist countries. Furthermore, the trade restrictions backfired to 
a certain extent: while the U.S. had an annual turnover of 200 million 
dollars with Eastern-Europe due to its self-imposed restrictions, 
Western-Europe enjoyed a 5 billion dollar-turnover with the same 
region annually.21 From the political point of view, this rigid 
economic antagonism only strengthened the national self-sufficiency 
of the East-European countries and thus the U.S. had fewer and fewer 
means to influnce the societies there. 
b. The mainlines of the policies of the Kennedy Administration 
toward Eastern-Europe 
As we have already seen it, John F. Kennedy supported the Polish 
loan in 1957; in his speeches and in his The Strategy of Peace (1960) 
he proposed that the improved trade relations with the satellites in 
Eastern-Europe would loosen the ties between them and the Soviet 
Union. However, the Kennedy Administration was paralyzed by the 
failure in the Bay of Pigs incident, and the Vienna Summit and the 
erection of the Berlin Wall even further limited its activity in the 
region. It was mostly symbolic gestures that indicated an intended, 
though rather slow departure from the earlier confrontational policies 
and rhetoric: in 1962 the Assistant Secretary of State, William R. 
Tyler explained that the East-European countries were more like 
99 
"junior partners" than satellites" ; Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
suggested that "power is being diffused from the center" in the region, 
though "/T/he results of this massive and glacial movement cannot be 
expected soon"23; or Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee 
declared proposed that the socialist countries should be given the 
2,1 ibid. 173. 
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chance to join the international community of the free nations." The 
Kennedy Administration thought that time had come to take the 
initiative after the Cuban missile crisis and two of its high-ranking 
advisers, Walt W. Rostow and McGeorge Bundy drafted a policy 
paper in which they suggested the the U.S. give up its Cold War 
politics, recognize the realities in world politics—which would have 
meant the final abandonment of the "liberation" of the East-European 
nations. However, the plan was leaked to a Republican representative, 
J. Arthur Young, who demanded an explanation from Rusk. At the 
same time, Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona started to talk about an 
"East-European Munich" and a counter-attack was initiated in the 
press, too. The Administration backed off: Assistant Secretary of State 
in charge of Congressional matters, Frederick G. Dutton wrote a letter 
to Rep. Young and assured him that the plan was just a plan and no 
change could be expected in the East-European policies of the 
Administration.25 It was true that no drastic changes were effected, but 
after the summer of 1963 President Kennedy started a more or less 
new course in the East-West relations: in his major speech at the 
American University in June 1963 he called upon the Communist 
countries to start a dialogue with the West on the basis of mutual 
interests; then the Administration signed the Atom Test Ban Treaty in 
Moscow on August 5; while the President announced on October 10 
that he supported the intended sale of wheat to the Soviet Union and 
the extension of intermediate-term loans and credits to the Communist 
countries. 
In reality, the U.S.-East-European relations meant the bilateral 
American-Polish and American-Yugoslav ties in the region (excluding 
the Soviet Union). While Albania, Czechoslovakia, East-Germany and 
Hungary received altogether 545 million dollar aid from the U.S. in 
the form of UNRRA and other programs between July 1945 and June 
1962, Poland 
got 1356 million and Yugoslavia 2720 million dollars in 
various forms.26 However, the economic relations were rather 
24 For the exchange of letters, the Goldwater speeches, and the articles printed in the 
Congressional Record see New Hungarian Central Archives, KÜM XIX-J-1-j, 
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insignificant on the whole. The U.S. exported into the East-European 
countries only in the value of 167 million dollars in 1963—some 45 
million dollars out of it went to Poland under PL 480. This sum 
amounted to 0.7% of the total export of the U.S. (23.207 million 
dollars). On the other hand, the U.S. imports from these countries 
were even lower: the import from the East-European countries in the 
value of 85 million dollars meant only 0.5% of the total import into 
America. The Cuban missile crisis affected the trade relations in an 
adverse way: Congress called upon the President to terminate the most 
favored nation status of Poland and Yugoslavia and it even accepted 
an amendment which prohibited the extension of aid to Communist 
countries. The Administration suspended the issuance of export 
licences to the Communist countries during and right after the Cuban 
missile crisis despite the fact that after Yugoslavia (1948), Poland 
(1960). Rumania (1960), Bulgaria also settled its outstanding financial 
claims with the U.S. in 1963 and thus—on paper—became qualified 
for American aid. In essence, the intensification of the Cold War as a 
result of the various crises over Berlin, the Cuban-question, and the 
mounting tension in Southeast-Asia (at that time, especially in Laos) 
all contributed to the failure of the intended new approach to the East-
West relations during the Kennedy Administration. 
A special case in the U.S.-East European relations in the years 
1956-1962 was provided by the "Hungarian question" in the United 
Nations. The representatives of the U.S. challenged the credentials of 
the Hungarian delegates at every possible international forum after 
1956; the debate about the legitimacy of the new Hungarian regime 
and its acceptance by the U.S. was mostly carried on in the U.N. 
though. On January 10, 1957 a Committee of Five was sent out to 
investigate into the "Hungarian question" (Australia, Denmark, 
Ceylon, Tunisia, and Uruguay). After a long debate, the U.S. gained 
enough support to block the official Hungarian delegate's admission 
and, in response, the Hungarian government ordered Edward 
Thompson Wailes out of the country: the diplomat arrived on 
November 2, 1956 and refused to present his credentials to the Kádár-
government in protest against their collaboration with the Soviets. By 
the summer of 1957 ten different resolutions had been passed by the 
UN, which called upon the Soviets to refrain from using force in 
Hungary—to no avail. Under domestic pressure (both Congressional 
and popular), the U.S. Administration requested a special session of 
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the UN to discuss the "Hungarian question" on June 27, 1957. John 
Foster Dulles sent out a circular to the American representations 
around the world in which let them know the goals of the American 
delegation in the UN: (1) with the help of the report of the Committee 
of Five to refute the Soviets' account of the events in Hungary; (2) to 
have the report accepted by the General Assembly in general, and by 
the Asian countries in particular, so as to undermine Soviet positions 
in the world; and (3) to make the secret trials held in Budapest against 
the revolutionaries public.2 ' In reality, the U.S. maintained its strict 
opposition to the acceptance of the mandate of the Hungarian 
delegation, which slowly became a liability to the West in the East-
West relations. The British Foreign Secretary, Selvyn Lloyd warned 
the Americans on November 26, 1957 that "many delegations at the 
UN in all geographical groups are at present very anxious to avoid 
anything likely to increase East-West tension Moreover, the 
problem of the Hungarian primate, József Mindszenty, who fled to the 
American Embassy in November 1956 and eventually stayed there 
until 1971, could also trigger a "major quarrel ... /which/ might upset 
the present delicate balance in Poland by forcing Gomulka and the 
Polish Catholics to take sides .,."29 The expulsion of the Hungarians 
from the UN might have resulted in the expulsion of the Western 
diplomats from Budapest, and that was not in the interest of the U.S. 
or any other Western country as the Hungarian capital was one of the 
most important outposts of them in the satellite countries. With the 
death of the implacable Dulles, the "gradualists" gained the upper 
hand in the State Department and the attacks on the Soviets and their 
Hungarian stooges became more and more restrained. The incoming 
Kennedy Administration did not wish to risk its new policies toward 
the countries of Asia and Africa; finally, as a result of the talks started 
between the Americans and the Hungarians in October 1962, the U.S. 
dropped the "Hungarian question" from the agenda of the UN and the 
Hungarian government simultaneously proclaimed amnesty to those 
still in prison because of their activities in 1956. The case was worth 
discussing in details because it casts a light on the interplay of the 
27 ibid. 
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U.S. policies and objectives in the "third world" and in Communist 
Eastern-Europe. 
3. "Building bridges" and the impact of the Vietnam War on the 
U.S.-East-European relations 
At the death of John F. Kennedy, his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson 
promised continuity both in domestic and international affairs. With 
reference to the Communist countries, he proposed to "build 
bridges"—though the metaphor did not apply exclusively to this group 
of the countries. The Eisenhower Administration made some weak 
attempts to open up "new paths" between the East and the West, but 
Soviet intransigence made the initiative a dead issue at the Geneva 
Summit in 195 5.30 Lyndon Johnson himself, who was the Senate 
majority leader at that time, suggested the introduction of an "open 
curtain" policy in New York in 1957; this approach was at variance 
with the current Republican policies but it meshed with John F. 
Kennedy's ideas. As a matter of fact, it was even more radical than 
those because Kennedy believed that it was only Poland and 
Yugoslavia that should benefit from the liberalization of American 
policies toward the East-European satellites. 
President Johnson announced his new approach at the opening of 
the George C. Marshall Library at the Virginia Military Institute in 
Virginia on May 23, 1964. He pledged himself to continue Marshall's 
vision "to build bridges—bridges of trade, travel, and humanitarian 
assistance—across the gulf that divide us from Eastern Europe.'"1 
However, the "liberal" Johnson had to be cautious because of his 
Republican opponents and the conservative—mostly Southern— 
politicians of his party. Thus, he welcomed the opportunity that the 
Chamber of Commerce, after its conference held in the White House 
in 1963, urged the liberalization of the East-West trade: Johnson 
supported the establishment of further economic ties with the 
Communist bloc and, at the same time, effected considerable changes 
in the cultural exchange programs and political relations as well. 
The Johnson Administration wished to gain broader support for its 
foreign political initiatives than its predecessor. The most prominent 
30 Johnson. Lyndon B. The Vantage Point. New York, 1971. 471. 
31 See McKitterick. op. cit. 1-2. 
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members of the administration appeared before the various 
committees on Capitol Hill. Secretary of State Dean Rusk spelt out the 
guiding principles of the administration toward the Communist 
countries before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: (1) to 
prevent the Communists from gaining more ground and to make il as 
expensive and useless for them as possible; and (2) to encourage the 
establishment a larger degree of independence and the evolutionary 
processes leading to an "open" society within the Communist bloc. ~ 
Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman elaborated on the latter 
point before the same forum: the East-European peoples should freely 
decide what form of government they wished to live under, they 
should entertain "natural relationships" with their neighbors, including 
the Soviet Union. This last point echoes the statement made by John 
Foster Dulles in Dallas on October 26, 1956; it is less known, though, 
that President Johnson advised his Ambassador to Warsaw, John A. 
Gronouski that besides working on the establishment of the Polish-
American friendly relations he should not put the Polish in a situation, 
which might result in the deterioration of the Polish-Soviet 
relationship because "the primary interest of the U.S. is the good 
relations with the Soviet Union." " 
However, the slow but gradual improvement of the relations 
between the U.S. and the East-European countries was arrested by the 
Vietnam War. While Secretary of State Rusk held a number of 
bilateral meetings with Foreign Ministers Péter (Hungarian), Gromiko 
(Soviet), David (Czechoslovak), Manescu (Rumanian), and Winewicz 
(Polish) at the UN in 1965, the escalation of the war erected 
unsurmounrable barriers on both sides before the further improvement 
of the relations. The U.S. found itself in a deadlock: it wished to 
improve the relations with the East-European Communist countries to 
counterbalance the effects of the Vietnam War, but it had to move 
very carefully because the Soviet Union had acquired a new 
importance in the eyes of the American leaders: they thought that the 
key to solve the Southeast-Asian situation was in Moscow. Thus, they 
did nat want to "disturb" the Soviet leadership with an increased 
degree of activity in Easter-Europe. At the same time, the Americans 
The Hungarian Chargé, János Radványi's report of his conversation with the 
Czechoslovak Ambassador, Drozniak. New Hungarian Central Archives, KÜM 
XIX-J-1 -j, US A TÜK Box 13,4-1. 103. 001 303 / f l . 
1 Fulbright, J. William. The Arrogance of Power. New York, 1966. 120-121. 
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tried to make use of the Polish, the Hungarians, and the Rumanians in 
their half-secret negotiations with the North-Vietnamese. All these 
efforts were almost doomed from the beginning because the U.S. 
emphasized that it was waging a war against the Communists in 
Vietnam, and not against the Vietnamese; this attitude alienated those 
East-European countries which might not have deemed the Vietnam 
War so important from their point of view, provided it had not been 
against their comrades. Sen. J. William Fulbright recalls an incident 
that "an Eastern European diplomat told me that he regarded the 
Vietnam War as remote to the concerns of his own country except 
when he read statements in the American press celebrating the number 
of "communists" killed in a particular week or battle. Then, he said he 
was reminded that America considered itself to be at war not merely 
14 
with some Vietnamese rebels but with Communists in gener al. It is 
true, though, that in the latter case, it would have been the American 
public that would have withdrawn its support from the war even at the 
beginning of the conflict. Of course, it was not only the Vietnam War 
that worked against the relaxation of the East-West tension. The 
ideological orthodoxy in the East-European satellites contributed to 
the failure to a large degree too, as the American Ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia Jacob D. Beam writes in his memoirs: "I soon had to 
realize that President Johnson's 'bridge-building' program is not for 
Novotny..."0 The Vietnam War served as good excuse for blocking 
the "bridgeheads" and resuming ideological confrontation on both 
sides: it became more and more difficult to maintain the idea of 
seeking rapproachment with the enemy in the U.S.—-one of the 
"victims" of this atmosphere was the killing of the East-West Trade 
Relations Act in 1966—, while the "anti-imperialists" voices grew 
stronger on the other side and resulted in such actions as the 
"spontaneous" demonstration in front of the American Embassy in 
Budapest in February 1965. 
The most ambitious economic plan of the Johnson Administration 
was its attempt to place the East-West trade relations on a new basis. 
The President appointed a committee under the chairmanship of J. 
Irwin Miller in October 1964. The task of the Miller-committee was to 
' ' Beam, Jacob D. Multiple Exposure. New York, 1978. 152. 
For the lull text of the Report see American Foreign Policy. Current Documents, 
1965. Washington, D.C., 1968. 532-537; or DSB, Vol. LIV, NO. 1405. May 30, 
1966. 845-855. 
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suggest ways to revive the East-West trade relations. Lyndon Johnson 
justified the operation of the committee by declaring in his message to 
Congress on February 10, 1965 that with a view to improve the 
balance of payments of the country, the volume of trade should be 
enhanced. The Miller-committee handed the White House its report on 
April 29. Its major recommendations and findings were as follows: "... 
12. There is little doubt that the East European Communist countries 
are interested in purchasing more from the U.S. than they do now— 
principally machinery, equipment, complete plants, and technical data. 
This advanced technology could provide the U.S. with some of its 
most effective bargaining leverage for trade negotiations with 
Communist countries. ... 13. If we relaxed some of our restrictions, 
purchases from European Communist countries from the U.S. would 
probably rise in the short term. But their lack of foreign exchange 
would soon limit trade. In this sense, foreign exchange, rather than 
present U.S. export controls, is the major limitation on the potential 
for this trade. ... 14. The Committee has seen various estimates of our 
possible exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe over the next 
decade; none suggests that this trade could constitute a significant part 
of our total trade ... Whenever possible, we should use such /trade/ 
negotiations to gain agreements or understandings on such matters as 
library and information facilities, embassy quarters, the establishment 
of consulates, the jamming of broadcasts, the distribution of 
Government and other publications, and the initiation or expansion of 
cultural and technical exchanges ... 24. Trade with the U.S. should put 
pressure on Communist countries to move away from the rigid 
bilateralism ... it should encourage them to become more heavily 
engaged in the network of world trade and committed to the Western 
practices ... 25. U.S. aims in these negotiations must be political: we 
seek to encourage moves toward the external independence and 
internal liberalization of individual Communist countries. We are not 
interested in fostering animosities among European Communist 
nations. ... 36. Apart from the commercial risks, it is important to 
recognize that long-term credits could run counter to the central 
purpose of this trade and reduce its potential political benefits."36 The 
Report was accepted by each of the 12-member committee, except for 
Nathaniel Goldfinger, the Director of Research of the AFL-CIO. The 
36 DSB. Vol. LIV. No. 1405. May 30. 1966. 855. 
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trade union organization had already clashed with the administration 
over the sale of corn to the Soviets in the early 1960s, and now its 
representative again emphatically gave voice to their political 
concerns regarding the proposed East-West Trade Bill. Goldfinger 
declared that " ... /T/rade relations with the Soviet Union and its 
European satellites should be viewed as a tool of our Nation's foreign 
policy. Therefore, the Report should have placed greater emphasis on 
the political aspect of this issue. ... Moreover, we should have no 
illusions about the ability of trade, in itself, to alter Communist 
attitudes and policies ... Recognition of these realities should result in 
greater emphasis on the principle of quid pro quo concessions than is 
contained in the Report. In my opinion, there should be no expansion 
of trade, extension of Government-guaranteed credit or MFN /most 
favored nation/ tariff treatment without political quid pro quo 
concessions from them. ,.."37 The gist of the debate was whether the 
so-called spillover effect was a proper strategy to deal with the 
Communist countries or not. The idea was that gains in one field, say, 
in trade, will influence other areas, for instance political life. Actually, 
the goal was to turn the economic, cultural, and technical exchange 
gains into political capital—and that is exactly why the leaders of the 
Communist countries were afraid of opening even toward seemingly 
innocent fields, like scientific exchanges or even art exhibitions. 
The East-West Trade Relations Bill was killed in Congress. 
Consequently, President Johnson issued an Executive Order on 
October 7, 1966 in which he stated that it was a "national security 
interest" for the U.S. to provide credits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria through the Export-Import Bank. 8 The 
Johnson Administration took every opportunity to "educate" the 
American people, to explain them that the unilateral embargo-policy 
hurt only the U.S., while the West-European countries took the 
opportunity to fill in the vacuum and established lucrative trade 
relations with the eastern half of the continent. The data suggest the 
victory of the conservatives on both sides: the GDR, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria exported into the U.S. in the value of 
American Foreign Policy. Current Documents, 1966. Washington, D.C.. 1969. 
438. 
s The data are taken from the Hungarian Commercial Councillor Endre Kovács 's 
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a total of 45.6 million dollars in 1966 (Czechoslovakia's share alone 
amounted to 27.2 million), while the figure for 1967 was only 44.7 
million dollars. The American export into these countries amounted to 
102.9 and 74.8 million dollars respectively. As for Poland and 
Yugoslavia, they exported into the U.S. in the value of 157.1 and 
177.8 million dollars, and imported 226.4 and 157.4 million 
respectively in 1967. This downward curve took an even deeper dive 
with the crushing of the Prague Spring and modest increase came only 
with the new "multipolar" approach and "linkage" policies of the 
Nixon Administration. 
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